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Abstract
The ethical practices of credit rating agencies (CRAs), particularly following the 2008 financial crisis, have been subject 
to extensive analysis by economists, ethicists, and policymakers. We raise a novel issue facing CRAs that has to do with a 
problem concerning the transmission of epistemic status of ratings from CRAs to the beneficiaries of the ratings (investors, 
etc.), and use it to provide a new challenge for regulators. Building on recent work in philosophy, we argue that since CRAs 
have different stakes than the beneficiaries of the ratings in the ratings being accurate, what counts as knowledge (and as 
having ‘epistemic status’) concerning credit risk for a CRA may not count as knowledge (as having epistemic status) for 
the beneficiary. Further, as it stands, many institutional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) are bound by 
law to make some of their investment decisions dependent on the ratings of officially recognized CRAs. We argue that the 
observation that the epistemic status of ratings does not transmit from CRAs to beneficiaries makes salient a new challenge 
for those who think current regulation regarding the CRAs is prudentially justified, namely, to show that the harm caused by 
acting on a rating that does not have epistemic status for beneficiaries is compensated by the benefit from them acting on a 
CRA rating that does have epistemic status for the CRA. Unlike most other commentators, therefore, we offer a defeasible 
reason to drop references to CRAs in prudential regulation of the financial industry.
Keywords Credit rating agencies · Epistemology · Information and knowledge · Regulation
Introduction
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, various gov-
ernmental committees, journalists, economists, and ethicists 
have scrutinized the ethics of the credit-rating agencies 
(CRAs) (e.g., De Bruin 2017; Pagano and Volpin 2010; Sca-
let and Kelly 2012; Strier 2008). Guardian journalist Joris 
Luyendijk has called the CRAs the ‘all purpose bogeyman’ 
of the global financial crisis, and Paul Krugman has even 
gone as far as saying that their ratings are ‘literally worse 
than useless’.1 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, 
created by the US government in 2009, has rather boldly 
suggested that CRAs such as Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and 
Moody’s were a necessary contributing cause of the crisis - 
claiming that the crisis ‘could not have happened without the 
rating agencies’ (p.xxv). And even if these comments may 
be slightly hyperbolic, the complaints that led to that damn-
ing assessment are well-known and numerous: CRAs were 
completely re-miss with their ratings of structured finance 
instruments (asset-backed securities, etc.); they were much 
too slow to adjust ratings in the light of new data (it is strik-
ing, for instance, that in the days directly preceding Lehman 
Brothers’ demise on 15 September 2008, the largest CRAs 
still gave it good ratings); and their techniques as tying 
(where a CRA provides an unsolicited rating for a fee) and 
notching (where a CRA issues low ratings on asset-backed 
securities unless further assets constituting those securities 
are also rated) are seen to be ‘anti-competitive’ (Langhor and 
Langhor 2009). Note, finally, that it is the issuers of the to-
be-rated securities, not the beneficiaries of the ratings, that 
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pay the CRAs; many authors have claimed that this under-
lying issuer-pays remuneration model leads to unavoidable 
conflicts of interest (Bolton et al. 2007).
In this paper, we raise a completely new kind of issue 
facing the CRAs that has to do with a problem about calcu-
lating risk and communicating risk judgements. We argue 
that CRA judgements of creditworthiness (the ratings) suffer 
from what we call stakes sensitivity, a phenomenon recently 
described by philosophers.2 Since CRAs have different 
stakes than the beneficiaries of the ratings in the ratings 
being accurate, what counts as knowledge concerning credit 
risk for a CRA may not count as knowledge for the benefi-
ciary. The so-called epistemic status of a rating is, then, not 
necessarily transmitted from the CRA to its beneficiary. We 
argue that while this is not necessarily an ethical failure on 
the part of the CRAs, it does present a challenge for the 
regulation of CRAs as we know it. Currently, many institu-
tional investors (pension funds, insurance companies, etc.) 
are permitted to invest in securities above a certain threshold 
rating, set by law, where the rating is to be determined by 
a dozen officially recognized CRAs. A result of this is that 
good ratings are effectively ‘stamps of approval’ to invest 
(White 2010). We argue that if the law is to continue to make 
investment decisions dependent on the CRAs in contexts 
where stakes sensitivity arises then it is incumbent on the 
defenders of the law to demonstrate that the harm this may 
cause investors is compensated by the benefit from investors 
acting on CRA ratings that have epistemic status for the 
CRA. We are sceptical that this challenge can be met, but we 
leave the possibility that it can open in this paper.
Unlike such authors on this issue as Scalet and Kelly 
(2012), we therefore, argue for a potential bit of deregula-
tion, and as such our paper may well buttress arguments 
put forward by Richardson and White (2009), and De Bruin 
(2017).
The structure of this article is as follows. Introducing 
some background facts about CRAs and their ratings, Sect. 2 
argues that, alongside two other roles they play, ratings are to 
be seen as judgements concerning credit risk (default risk) of 
issuers of rated securities. In Sect. 3, we introduce some new 
ideas that have recently emerged in philosophy. We argue 
that CRAs operate in a context in which stakes sensitivity 
ensures that a knowledge claim about credit risk made by a 
CRA may not lead to the ratings’ beneficiaries’ possessing 
knowledge about credit risk. Section 4 concludes by examin-
ing the policy repercussions of our diagnosis.
Judging Risk
CRAs rate debt. Using letters ranging from AAA (almost 
riskless) to the D of default, CRAs publish their judgements 
on the credit risk of debt issued by companies, countries, 
provinces, territories, water authorities, municipalities, and, 
more recently, of structured finance instruments such as 
mortgage-backed securities and collateralized debt obliga-
tions.3 They are often claimed to wield enormous power. The 
New York Times journalist Thomas Friedman (1995) presci-
ently observed more than two decades ago that ‘the U.S. can 
destroy a country by levelling it with bombs, [but] Moody’s 
can destroy a country by downgrading its bonds’. To illus-
trate, it is unsurprising, for instance, that when Standard 
& Poor’s downgraded the US on 5 August 2011 (the first 
downgrade of the US debt ever), the Obama administration 
undertook a concerted media campaign to dissuade inves-
tors from taking the downgrade seriously. Dovetailing this 
point is the fact that, following the 2008 financial crisis, part 
of the UK government’s justification of austerity measures 
(spending cuts and tax rises) was to prevent a downgrading 
of the UK ratings. And the CRAs not only backed this up, 
but explicitly endorsed the government policy. In September 
2010, for instance, Moody’s claimed that ‘[t]he stable out-
look on the UK’s AAA rating is largely driven by the Gov-
ernment’s commitment to stabilise and eventually reverse 
the deterioration in its financial strength’.4
When we look back at the history of the CRAs, we see 
that they existed in an earlier guise as so-called credit report-
ing firms (Olegario 2006; Poon 2012; Sinclair 2008). After 
the US Civil War, as trade distances increased, merchants 
became increasingly unable to always evaluate for them-
selves their business partners’ credibility and creditworthi-
ness. So they had to resort to third-party information. Credit 
reporting firms tapped into a demand for such information—
a demand that was large because a great deal of trade at the 
time involved trade credit. Credit reporting firms therefore 
started collecting information from sheriffs, cashiers, and 
other reliable ‘correspondents’, and made this available 
to business people to assist them in estimating the trust-
worthiness of individual merchants, small- and mid-sized 
2 The terminology is ours. Philosophers use terms such as ‘subject 
sensitivity’, ‘interest relativity’, ‘context sensitivity’.
3 Credit risk is the risk that an issuer fails to pay interest and/or does 
not pay back the loan, and is generally distinguished from market 
risk, liquidity risk, country risk, etc. The methods used to rate these 
bonds differ in obvious respects. Our argument applies to the three 
main categories of assets that CRAs rate: government bonds, corpo-
rate bonds, and structure debt Moreover, ratings of government bonds 
(ratings of countries, provinces, etc.) also capture an estimation of the 
risk that the willingness to pay deteriorates as the result of particular 
political developments. See White (2010) for an overview.
4 www.teleg raph.co.uk/finan ce/econo mics/80136 17/Auste rity-plan-
helps -UK-retai n-top-AAA-ratin g.html.
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businesses, and sometimes even large corporations, as wit-
nessed by Henry Varnum Poor’s well-known 1860 History 
of Railroads and Canals of the United States (Poor 1860).
For a long time, the main business model of credit report-
ing firms was the following: they collected information 
from correspondents, transmitted it to their clients, who 
then made their own judgements about creditworthiness 
ultimately based on that information. But in the 1910s, this 
model underwent a change the importance of which we can 
hardly overestimate. The credit-reporting firms now started 
publishing their own assessments of creditworthiness, 
introduced the letter system that we have today, and rapidly 
expanded into bond rating. That is to say, credit reporting 
firms no longer left it to the users of their information to 
make their own judgements concerning credit risk; instead, 
they provided these users with their judgements about credit 
risks.5
The importance of this change in business model has 
been highlighted by various authors (e.g., Olegario 2006; 
Sinclair 2008). It is also key to the argument we develop in 
this paper. It makes salient the fact that the CRAs are not so 
much informational intermediaries, transmitting information 
to beneficiaries who subsequently make up their own minds. 
On the contrary, CRAs are themselves responsible for evalu-
ating and interpreting the information they collect, and for 
aggregating the information into one judgement about credit 
risk (captured in the lettered scores from AAA to D). Unlike 
the earlier credit reporting firms, what CRAs have published 
since the beginning of the twentieth century is best under-
stood as judgements that are the result of the agencies’ own 
evaluation, interpretation, and aggregation of information 
(Olegario 2006). A rating therefore represents a knowledge 
claim, or at the very least a claim carrying ‘epistemic status’ 
(we explain this later).
A second and equally important step was to follow, how-
ever. Two years after the crash of 1929, the US Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency decided to regulate on the 
basis of a distinction between investment and non-investment 
grade bonds. It required banks to treat the latter as more 
risky, and to make a clear distinction between the two types 
of securities on their balance sheets. Half a decade later an 
outright proscription against investing in what is  now called 
speculative (non-investment) bonds followed. In itself, this 
may seem a reasonable measure, aimed at protecting US 
citizens against the effects of a next crisis. What is impor-
tant for our argument, however, is that what counted as non-
investment or speculative was to be determined solely by a 
handful of officially recognized credit rating agencies. As 
a leading expert on credit rating agencies describes it, the 
CRAs’ judgements of creditworthiness ‘attained the force of 
law’ (White 2010, p. 213). It is important to underscore that 
these were measures primarily directed at financial stabil-
ity, which concerns the financial system as a whole, and in 
particular its ability to absorb shocks. Protection of investors 
was not the main reason why ratings obtained the force of 
law.
And they never seem to have lost that force again. In 
1975, a registry of Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating 
Organizations was created, selecting the few CRAs that may 
play a role in prudential regulation, and even in periods of 
deregulation, the judgements of CRAs have been legally 
binding to many investors. As Pagano and Volpin (2010) 
observe, when in 1989 it became possible for pension funds 
to invest in asset-backed securities, the conditions stipulated 
that they must only buy highly rated such securities. In line 
with White (2010), these authors therefore conclude that a 
result of the regulation was that the investment decisions of 
banks, pension funds, insurance companies, and other insti-
tutional investors are crucially restricted by what judgements 
CRAs arrive at.6
While this does not mean that institutional investors were 
legally mandated to fully ‘outsource’ their judgements of 
creditworthiness in all circumstances (De Bruin 2017), 
economists (see White 2010 for a survey) and sociologists 
(see Poon 2012 for a survey) observe that as a result of these 
regulatory developments ratings currently do a number of 
different things. Following the economics and sociology of 
finance literature we identify the following three functions.
(1) Ratings express judgements about creditworthiness.
(2) Ratings are used in monitoring issuers of rated securi-
ties.
(3) Ratings can figure as directives to investors.
To begin with the first, a rating stands for the CRA’s 
judgement about the default risk attached to a particular 
security. The standard way in which CRAs describe rat-
ings is as ‘opinions’. Standard & Poor’s webpage devoted 
to explaining what a rating is, for instance, states: ‘Our rat-
ings express our opinion about the ability and willingness 
of an issuer’.7 Authors such as Partnoy (1999) believe, how-
ever, that the use of the word ‘opinion’ is primarily meant 
to lay off liability for potential negative consequences of 
flawed ratings. Staging themselves as publishers of opinions 
on a par with news media such as newspapers, radio, and 
5 CRAs also produce outlooks and watchlists. We ignore these instru-
ments here, but come back to them later when we discuss the implicit 
contract between issuers and agencies.
6 Internal documents and contracts may also specify conditions refer-
ring to CRAs. We are here only concerned with restrictions that are 
set by regulators.
7 www.sprat ings.com/en_US/under stand ing-ratin gs.
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television (or the press more generally) has so far success-
fully ensured that CRAs enjoy far-reaching First Amend-
ment (freedom of expression) protection.
In fact, there is a great deal of evidence that in more tech-
nical contexts (documents, briefings, etc.) CRAs do describe 
themselves as ‘judging-to-be-true’ rather than ‘opining’. 
Describing the final stages of the rating procedure, Standard 
& Poor’s write, for instance, that they use ‘forward-looking 
analysis and analytic judgment to determine the ultimate rat-
ing conclusion with the goal of transparency and rating com-
parability’8 [our emphasis]. Secondly, specifically regarding 
the way in which they arrive at a rating for banks, Moody’s 
lists a number of factors that ‘inform [their] judgment about 
the level of support willingness for each major debt class’, 
and observe that the rating committee ‘may then employ its 
judgment of the specific circumstances in question to assign 
a given number of notches of support’ [our emphasis].9
For a statement to count as a judgement (or as the result 
of judging) it has to be based on careful consideration of rel-
evant evidence. It involves assessing the merits of potential 
sources of information, appraising the strength of available 
evidence, settling for particular analytical tools to apply to 
the case at hand, and so forth. Judging has a decisional ele-
ment to the effect that when one judges something to be the 
case, one has deemed the evidence backing up the judge-
ment sufficient to warrant one to proceed on the basis of the 
assumption that it is the case. And, indeed, if CRAs did not 
issue such judgements (and only expressed genuine opin-
ions), one might reasonably wonder whether the role they 
play in regulation is at all legitimate; for, in the language we 
explain in Sect. 3, ratings need to have epistemic status in 
order for them to be of any legitimate use, which roughly 
means that they need to be more than just a ‘wild guess’. The 
upshot of this is that we should understand CRAs to be pro-
viding investors with a judgement about creditworthiness.
The second way we can understand credit rating is to be 
monitoring the issuers of the rated securities. Economists 
such as Boot et al. (2006) have found evidence of what 
they call implicit contracts that are present between many 
CRAs and issuers. The CRAs can inform issuers (through 
published statements including so-called ‘watchlists’ and 
‘outlooks’) about conditions that, if satisfied, will ensure 
that the security is not downgraded (or is upgraded). Issuers 
honouring this ‘contract’ will then be assured that their rat-
ing remains the same.10 Boot et al. (2006) give the following 
instructive example. In the early years of the new millen-
nium, telecom companies passed through a number of rat-
ings downgrades that were accompanied by statements to 
the effect that a CRA—Moody’s in this case—left them a 
period of about one and a half years to reduce their debt in 
order  to prevent another downgrade. And where Boot et al. 
(2006) focus only on corporate debt, the turmoil surrounding 
the rating of US debt illustrates how similar (yet often much 
less explicit and outspoken) contracts may operate between 
CRAs and other issuers of debt. For instance, after Standard 
& Poor’s downgraded the US in 2011, Moody’s in 2012 
announced that it would follow if Congress failed to reach a 
deal to reduce the budget deficit—a fairly explicit formula-
tion of a ‘contract’ in the sense of Boot et al. (2006).
Following White (2010), the third way in which we can 
understand credit ratings has to do with the role that ratings 
play with respect to institutional investors. We call this its 
directive function. As we saw, legally binding guidelines 
for institutional investors such as pension funds and insur-
ance companies often only allow investments in securities 
with sufficiently high ratings. This has a striking effect on 
investment behaviour. There is robust evidence that inves-
tors generally respond to downgrades, but not to upgrades 
(White 2010). If ratings were merely passing on judgements 
about credit risk to investors, one would expect investors to 
respond to downgrades and upgrades alike: from a financial 
point of view, one should ceteris paribus adjust one’s invest-
ment strategies just as much when credit risk increases as 
when it decreases.11 That downgrades count more heavily 
is therefore generally seen as supporting the view that rat-
ings do not just reflect credit risk, but also give directions to 
investors—a role they would ultimately not have were it not 
for legislation (White 2010). Downgrades close to the legal 
threshold, that is, are directives to sell.12
10 Boot et  al. (2006) do not intend contract to refer to something 
explicitly written down. Rather a contract implicitly arises due to 
the fact that CRAs constantly monitor firms and use watchlists and 
11 We note in passing that we are well aware of the fact that invest-
ment decisions are not only determined by considerations of risk and 
expected return, but also by such factors as a concern for diversifica-
tion, or positive and negative screening in socially responsible invest-
ing. But these factors do not explain the asymmetrical responses to 
downgrades and upgrades.
12 The extent to which a rating is used as a directive depends on 
whether the rating is close to the legal threshold. The pronounced 
response by investors to downgrades is, however, also visible for 
higher rated debt (see Gonzales et  al. 2004 for a literature review). 
Clearly, an investor’s response to a downgrade also depends on other 
factors, such as the role the asset plays in the portfolio’s diversifica-
tion, internal risk management procedures, etc. Close to the legal 
threshold, however, a downgrade will trump most of these considera-
tions, though.
8 www.sprat ings.com/docum ents/20184 /77419 6/Corpo rate+Ratin 
gs+Metho dolog y.pdf/8fd43 92a-4aae-4669-bd74-a9b86 e18d7 81.
9 www.moody s.com/micro sites /brm/SP299 13_Analy tical Appro ach.
pdf?WT.z_refer rings ource =BRM~Overv iew.
outlooks to specify the conditions that might lead to a downgrade or 
upgrade.
Footnote 10 (continued)
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So far we have largely focused on ratings of corporate and 
government debt. But CRAs obtain a significant part of their 
revenues from rating structured finance instruments. Here 
it seems that there cannot be an implicit contract between 
the CRA and the issuer, because once the security has been 
designed, there is nothing the issuer can do to prevent the 
risks of a downgrade.
To set the stage: A typical mortgage-backed security 
starts with a mortgage lender (the originator) provid-
ing funds to house owners. An investment bank (called 
arranger) buys a collection of mortgages from the origina-
tor, and creates a Special Purpose Vehicle that buys these 
mortgages from the arranger, securitizing them (issuing 
mortgage-backed securities). The CRAs, then, provide rat-
ings of (tranches of) these securities, which the investment 
bank can then sell to investors.13
Analysing the information CRAs use to arrive at these 
judgements, Pagano and Volpin (2010) observe that until 
2007 Moody’s only considered information from the pro-
spectuses and annual reports provided by the Special Pur-
pose Vehicle to arrive at their ratings. These documents do 
not provide information concerning individual mortgages 
and borrowers (such as the loan-to-value ratio or the bor-
rower’s credit score), despite the fact that, as the authors 
show, such information is essential to get a reliable rating. 
Hence they conclude that at least until 2007 (when the sub-
prime mortgage meltdown started), Moody’s used decidedly 
suboptimal rating strategies for important classes of struc-
tured debt. They offer no reasons why Fitch and Standard & 
Poor’s should be expected to be different.
One might think that this shows that the ratings of struc-
tured securities are intended to play a different role than 
ratings concerning corporate and government bonds. As we 
remarked above, it is certainly true that ratings of struc-
tured debt are unlikely to have a monitoring function. The 
Special Purpose Vehicle is not an entity that can change 
policies in response to ratings, as firms and states can do, 
so it seems that there can be no implicit contract between 
it and the CRA.14 But, nonetheless, these ratings are judge-
ments of creditworthiness, and they offer directives to inves-
tors. Ratings of structured debt are meant to capture credit 
risk in exactly the same way as they capture credit risk of 
corporate and government bonds. For instance, Standard & 
Poor’s writes that their ‘ratings represent a uniform measure 
of credit quality globally and across all types of debt instru-
ments… [i]n other words, an “AAA” rated corporate bond 
should exhibit the same degree of credit quality as an “AAA” 
rated securitized issue’ (quoted by Pagano and Volpin 2010, 
p. 407). (Standard & Poor’s was wide off the mark, but that 
is a different story.) Similarly, as Pagano and Volpin (2010) 
show, deregulation in the 1980s allowed pension funds to 
invest in asset-backed securities on the condition that they 
buy highly rated securities only. These authors persuasively 
argue that the ratings of structured debt contributed signifi-
cantly to investor demand for such securities. They observe 
that even as late as 2008, for instance, there were more than 
sixty thousand structured finance instruments of the highest 
possible rating, but there were only twelve triple A rated 
corporations. It is unsurprising that with such ‘stamps of 
approval’, as White (2010) calls the ratings, many institu-
tional investors bought structured finance.
Let us take stock. By using insights from the economics 
and sociology literatures on CRAs we have seen that because 
of historical and legal developments, CRAs as we know 
them today have three functions: they publish judgements 
about credit risk; they monitor issuers through implicit con-
tracts; and they provide directives to institutional investors. 
For the time being we have not made any normative judge-
ment regarding their practices, but having made our target 
clear in terms of what credit ratings do, we now move to 
raise a problem for the CRAs brought into relief by recent 
research in philosophy.
Stakes Sensitivity of Knowledge 
Transmission
There is widespread agreement among philosophers that we 
tend to be less inclined to attribute knowledge to people with 
regard to a proposition when there is a lot at stake as regards 
to its the truth.15 To give a slightly simplified example for 
13 See Pagano and Volpin (2010) for an excellent more detailed expo-
sition.
14 CRAs have been accused of having played a role in the design of 
certain structured finance instruments, with the goal of constructing 
a security that minimally qualifies for a particular rating. One might 
consider this to be an implicit contract in the sense of Boot et  al. 
(2006), because the CRA somehow commits itself to giving the secu-
rity a particular rating. But we believe that the temporal aspect that is 
essential to the model of Boot et al. (2006) is missing here (the issuer 
cannot change the security after it has been designed). That is why we 
are inclined not to consider this to be an instance of monitoring.
15 One of the first studies in contemporary epistemology pointing 
this out was DeRose (1992). See, e.g., DeRose (2011) for a more up 
to date case and survey of its reception. However, the issue of how 
practical matters affect what is known is a very old one in philoso-
phy and may, arguably, go all the way back to Plato. Certainly, the 
issue is important to thinkers in the so-called ‘continental tradition’ as 
Nietzsche, Foucault and Habermas, as well as contemporary thinkers 
in philosophy of science working on inductive risk (for a good over-
view see Elliot 2017), and of course the well-known ‘underdetermi-
nation (of evidence on theory choice) thesis’ can be read as showing 
how practical values are ultimately guiding what is known (e.g. Kuhn 
1974; Laudan 1984). We focus on the contemporary epistemology lit-
erature, which given its focus on thresholds for knowledge illustrates 
the problem with CRAs best.
 A. Booth, B. de Bruin 
1 3
ease of exposition, ask yourself: do you know whether you 
locked your car this morning in the car park? Suppose that 
you answer in the affirmative. Then suppose a colleague tells 
you, and you believe her, that she saw two youths vandal-
izing an apparently unlocked car in the car park just a few 
minutes ago. If you experience even a little more reluctance 
to say that you know whether you locked the car once your 
colleague tells you how high the stakes may be, then you 
have experienced the intuition in question. For the sake of 
exposition in this article, we call this phenomenon stakes 
sensitivity. (A more precise definition follows below.)
Most philosophers accept that any good analysis of 
knowledge ought to take stakes sensitivity into account.16 
There are broadly three kinds of response called contextual-
ism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and, as mentioned, pur-
ist invariantism.17 It should be noted that the latter (purist 
invariantism) is a way of maintaining the traditional view of 
knowledge, despite stakes sensitivity (where the ‘traditional 
view of knowledge’ is one according to which what, and 
how much, is at stake makes no difference at all to what one 
knows). This should hopefully clarify to people unfamil-
iar with this literature that ‘stakes sensitivity’ itself is not 
taken to be controversial—it is how one responds to it that 
is debated. We will now seek to briefly describe these views, 
aiming to steer a middle course between making the material 
intelligible while appealing to the general reader, and doing 
justice to the specialists’ concerns.18
According to contextualism, what explains stakes sensi-
tivity of knowledge transmission is that the semantic value 
of the word ‘knowledge’ (and its correlates) is context-sensi-
tive (e.g., DeRose 1992; Lewis 1996). Context-sensitivity is 
a very familiar idea among linguists, and the semantic value 
of words such as ‘tall’ are uncontroversially considered to 
be context-sensitive. The idea is that just as it is not right to 
call someone ‘tall’ in a context which ‘contains’ only taller 
people (even though in other contexts she may be adequately 
described as ‘tall’), it is accurate to say that you do not know 
whether you locked the car in a context where you have just 
heard that two youths may be vandalizing your car.
A different way of responding, which is going to be the 
focus of this article, is to appeal to what has become known 
as subject-sensitive invariantism (Fantl and McGrath 2009; 
Hawthorne 2013; Stanley 2005, 2008). According to this 
view, the semantic value of the word ‘knows’ does not vary 
depending on the context it is used in (hence ‘invariantism’ 
instead of ‘contextualism’). Yet the standards for knowledge 
are sensitive to whether the stakes are high or low for a given 
knowing subject. Subjects for whom the stakes are high with 
respect to some proposition must satisfy higher evidential 
demands in order to possess knowledge of the proposition 
than subjects for whom the stakes are low. An illustrative 
analogy is to compare standards that professionals have to 
meet. While ‘coastal guard’ in Britain and Australia refers to 
the same profession, the standards that coastal guards have 
to satisfy differ, because Australian waters contain other 
dangers than British (sharks, for instance).
For purist invariantism, finally, to account for stakes 
sensitivity, we need an explanation in terms of pragmatics 
or conversational implicature, rather than one grounded in 
observations concerning semantics (thought to be different 
from pragmatics) or standards of knowledge (Brown 2005; 
Reed 2010). The view is that we are less likely to attribute 
knowledge in high-stakes situations because by uttering the 
word ‘know’ in such situations we would often pragmati-
cally (as opposed to semantically) entail certain things we 
do not wish to be held accountable for. In high-stakes situ-
ations, we are less inclined to assert that the subject should 
act on their knowledge about some proposition, and so this 
makes us less likely to want to say that the subject knows 
a proposition; for if we said that they knew, we would be 
pragmatically implying that the subject should be allowed 
to act on their knowledge.19
While this looks like a very promising response, contex-
tualists typically reply that this violates the plausible prin-
ciple to the effect that we should assert propositions only if 
we know them. This is captured by the so-called knowledge-
based norm of assertion (as opposed to, say, a belief-based 
norm of assertion). Williamson (1996, 2000), probably the 
most cited proponent of such a knowledge-based norm of 
assertion, thinks that this norm is constitutive of any speech 
act. That is, to the extent we take ourselves to be saying 
something, we must take our utterance to be governed by 
a knowledge-based norm of assertion. Every assertion we 
16 Some ‘experimental’ philosophers cast doubt on the claim that 
members of the general public have the same intuitions as profes-
sional philosophers about these kinds of case (e.g., Buckwalter 2010; 
Buckwalter and Schaffer 2015). The methodology of experimental 
philosophy (as well as its putative results in this case) have been sub-
ject to criticism (Nagel 2012; Mortensen and Nagel 2016).
17 For current purposes, we set aside variants of these three strands. 
See, e.g., DeRose (2011) for details.
18 We set aside various issues, including the question of whether one 
needs to distinguish a first-person and a third-person version of stakes 
sensitivity. See, e.g., DeRose (2011).
19 One might even think that rational choice theory (game theory) 
accords with this move, because on such an analysis it might seem 
that what is rational depends in part on what a subject’s utility func-
tion looks like, which among other things reflects the subject’s atti-
tude towards risk. Given two different utility functions, but the same 
beliefs (based on the same evidence), it may be rational to perform 
two different actions. It is currently an open question in the literature 
whether we should understand stakes in this way, though, and we do 
not want to take a stand on this issue here. Anderson and Hawthorne 
(forthcoming) evaluate various different, formal ways of modelling 
stakes are explored, and find all wanting.
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make is, then, a knowledge claim in the sense that you must 
take yourself to know it. Contextualism and the knowledge-
based norm of assertion are, then, ‘two sides of the same 
coin’ (DeRose 2002, p. 169). Subject-sensitive invarian-
tists, in turn, reply to the pure invariantist that knowledge 
rather figures in a norm of action on the grounds that it is 
counterintuitive to hold on to the view that if you know a 
proposition this might give you insufficient warrant to act 
on the proposition (Fantl and McGrath 2009). As a result, 
the purist invariantist thus either has to deny both of these 
plausible principles (the norm of assertion and the norm of 
action), or else try to show how her theory is compatible 
with them after all.
The claims about credit ratings we defend in this paper 
go through on all three views—since all accept the lin-
guistic data we are calling stakes sensitivity. Yet for ease 
of exposition, we focus on how subject-sensitive invariant-
ism explains the stakes sensitivity of knowledge transmis-
sion. Our argument therefore proceeds from the following 
principle:
(Knowledge Ascriptions) The higher the stakes are 
with respect to a proposition p, the more evidence is 
required for an agent S to know that p.
An immediate consequence of this principle is:
(Epistemic Status Transmission) If S’s stakes with 
respect to a proposition p are higher than T’s stakes 
with respect to p, and T knows p, then S may not know 
that p even if S has the exactly the same evidence as T.
Two clarificatory points are in order before we move to dis-
cuss how stakes sensitivity affects CRAs. First, we assume 
that agent S can be a group or an institution just as well 
as an individual. Secondly, while the principles above are 
parsed in terms of what S ‘knows’, it is meant to apply not 
only to knowledge in a strict sense, but to any state that has 
epistemic status, as it is called in the literature.
Let us explain the term. Epistemic status is an (always 
positive) appraisal of a cognitive attitude (knowledge, under-
standing, belief, wisdom, etc.) on the grounds of its satis-
fying certain conditions that make it justified, warranted, 
rational, etc. (We also use epistemic status in a derived sense 
to apply to what expresses these cognitive attitudes. In that 
sense, ratings can have epistemic status.) Something may 
have epistemic status, but yet fail to be knowledge, since 
one may have a justified, true belief that is not knowledge. 
Yet for a belief to have epistemic status it must be more 
than just a ‘wild guess’ or an unsupported opinion, even if 
by sheer coincidence the guess turned out to be true. Only 
sufficient evidence endows a belief with epistemic status. If 
you wildly guess on the basis of no evidence that Managua 
is the capital of Nicaragua your belief counts as having no 
epistemic status, even though it is true. A vague memory 
that it is will give you some evidence, but not enough to give 
your belief that Managua is the capital of Nicaragua epis-
temic status. This is why your belief here cannot have some 
epistemic status—it either has it, or it does not. A friend’s 
telling you that it is Managua may give your belief epistemic 
status, but if a lot depends on it (a colleague asked you to 
meet in the capital of Nicaragua and you are about to book a 
flight), you will need stronger evidence. This illustrates that 
the higher the stakes for S are with respect to p, the higher 
is the evidential threshold required for S for her belief that p 
to have epistemic status. Moreover, epistemic status is rela-
tive to the agent. My friend may have visited Nicaragua in 
the past, and so her belief has epistemic status. As long as 
I do not know this fact about my friend (and do not  know 
that she can be trusted as a source of information about this 
bit of geography), my belief may not have epistemic status. 
It is easier for us from now on to refer to this more techni-
cal notion of epistemic status. The reader may wonder why 
we talked about ‘knowledge’ at all and not began the paper 
immediately talking about epistemic status. The reason is 
that stakes sensitivity describes a linguistic phenomenon, 
and very few people in everyday English outside philoso-
phy departments talk about epistemic status. The ordinary 
person uses the word ‘knowledge’ to describe what we are 
talking about.
In the preceding section, we argued that when a CRA 
issues a rating we must interpret that as the CRA’s decision 
to form a judgement concerning credit risk. If the ratings 
were just wild guesses or merely unsupported opinions we 
would have to very seriously question their purpose, and it 
would be straightforwardly inappropriate for regulators to 
bind institutional investors to the ratings. In other words, for 
the CRA’s judgements of creditworthiness to be of any use 
to anyone, they need to have epistemic status in the above 
sense of the word. This means that they have to be based on 
relevant and sufficient evidence. To our knowledge, even 
when they claim that they are offering ‘opinions’, no CRA 
has hitherto denied that their ratings need to be based on 
relevant and sufficient evidence. This is underscored by 
such things as that CRAs make significant investments in 
research methodology. The question surely is whether the 
evidence that informs them is such that it confers epistemic 
status to what they say, that is, brings it closer to satisfying 
the requirements of genuine knowledge. There is, then, no 
reason to assume that the ratings are not subject to both the 
norm of assertion and the norm of action.
In line with the debate, two alternatives could at first sight 
be open. Recalling Krugman’s claim, quoted in the intro-
duction, CRAs might be ‘literally worse than useless’; if 
that is true, ratings would be more akin to a wild guess. We 
set this alternative aside, however, for present purposes. If 
Krugman’s verdict is true, then this offers a clear and imme-
diate argument against CRAs, making our argument here 
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superfluous. Moreover, as Richardson and White (2009) has 
observed, whether CRAs actually add value to the market 
can be considered to be a genuinely open research question. 
So we assume for the sake of our argument that ratings do 
have epistemic status, and hence are really evidence-based 
judgements.
Now to begin with, and in line with what CRAs them-
selves acknowledge, the following scenario may be true:
(Case 1) A CRA issues a rating based on (given what 
is at stake for the CRA) relevant and sufficient evi-
dence to a user who acts on the assumption that the 
rating is accurate, but who ends up making a bad 
financial decision because, consistently with the CRAs 
judgement as well as the used evidence, a low prob-
ability event materializes.
A second alternative may also obtain, though. It is this sce-
nario that we want to highlight in this paper, and which is 
not acknowledged by CRAs (or regulators for that matter).
(Case 2) A CRA issues a rating based on (given what 
is at stake for the CRA) relevant and sufficient evi-
dence to a user for whom (given what is at stake for the 
user) the same evidence is not relevant and sufficient.
Currently, CRAs and regulators seem to be sensitive only to 
Case 1 type of problems ratings may run into. CRAs explic-
itly warn investors, for instance, that their ratings are relative 
probability judgements, and that things with low likelihood 
may still happen. So even as relative probability judgements, 
users must take their ratings with caution, and not be taken 
as a direct recommendations. As Fitch put it in their Terms 
of Use:
[it] is not making any recommendation or suggestion, 
directly or indirectly to you, or any other person, to 
buy, sell, make or hold any investment, loan or security 
or to undertake any investment strategy with respect 
to any investment, loan or security of any issuer’ [our 
emphasis].20
It is important to note, however, that there is a difference 
between saying that their ratings are not recommendations, 
and saying that their ratings have no epistemic status. It is 
clear that no CRA wants investors to believe that their rat-
ings are not based on relevant and sufficient evidence—if 
they had no epistemic status, we would have no more reason 
to consult the CRAs than a Magic 8-Ball, so to speak.
We assume, then, that in Case 1 and 2, the ratings have 
epistemic status. Yet a difference remains; for unlike in Case 
1, in Case 2 types of situation, the epistemic status of the 
CRA rating does not transmit to give the rating epistemic 
status for the beneficiary of the rating. To see this, consider 
an institutional investor such as a pension fund. Clearly, the 
stakes in getting a correct risk assessment on a financial 
product they are thinking of buying or selling are much 
higher for the fund than for a CRA carrying out the rating, 
as their investment decisions affect their financial position 
and those of their clients (members). We are not denying 
of course that the CRA, in this particular case, comes to its 
judgement (the rating) based on relevant and sufficient evi-
dence to meet the threshold required for it to have positive 
epistemic status from the CRA’s vantage point. What we do 
observe, though, is that were the pension fund to marshal 
exactly the same evidence for themselves, that evidence 
would not meet the higher threshold entailed by the higher 
stakes. As such, the very same bits of evidence will yield, 
from the pension fund’s point of view, a belief about credit 
risk without epistemic status.
Before proceeding to illustrate how this may lead to the 
pension fund’s taking suboptimal financial decisions, it is 
important to note that we are not claiming that transmitting 
epistemic status is always bound to fail. The amount and 
quality of evidence that CRAs have to back their ratings dif-
fer. Some corporations or countries may provide more relia-
ble information than others, which translates into the ratings 
being more reliable. In such cases, even though the stakes of 
the CRA and its beneficiaries are different, the evidence the 
CRA possesses is sufficient to give the rating epistemic sta-
tus to the beneficiaries as well. If CRAs have evidence that is 
only minimally sufficient given their own stakes, knowledge 
will, however, not transmit to its beneficiaries.
When beneficiaries act on ratings that have little or no 
epistemic status for them, this may lead to suboptimal finan-
cial decisions. Consider the pension fund example again. 
Schematically, there are two scenarios here, depending on 
whether the fund would arrive at a higher or lower rating if it 
were to judge credit risk based on the same bits of evidence. 
If the fund’s own rating were higher, acting on the basis of 
the CRA’s rating leads to overly cautious investment behav-
iour. This type of situation can be witnessed when CRAs 
give ratings above but close to the legal threshold (close to 
‘speculative’ or ‘non-investment’ grade). As we saw above, 
in that type of situation and typically after a downgrade, 
institutional investors bound by law display selling behav-
iour that, if they acted on their own judgement only, they 
would not have engaged in (White 2010).
In the other type of situation, if the fund’s own ratings 
were lower than those of the CRAs, the fund is likely to 
assume risks that are inconsistent with its own risk  manage-
ment procedures. An example of this situation was given 
by Jorion (2009), who analysed purchases of structured 
securities at UBS, the Swiss bank. As we indicated above, 
the CRAs suggested that ratings are ‘uniform’ representa-
tions ‘across all types of debt instruments’, and that as a 20 www.fitch ratin gs.com/site/about /terms .
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result, ‘an “AAA” rated corporate bond should exhibit the 
same degree of credit quality as an “AAA” rated securitized 
issue’ (quoted by Pagano and Volpin 2010, p. 407). UBS 
believed as much, for as Jorion (2009) shows, UBS assumed 
that highly rated tranches of certain asset-backed securities 
would behave as corporate debt with similar ratings. From 
the point of view of the CRA, there was sufficient evidence 
to back that claim (in the years before the 2008 crisis). 
Newly developed mathematical models were generally seen 
as highly reliable instruments to estimate these risks. The 
CRAs, however, would not stand to lose much if the ratings 
turned out to be less accurate. UBS, however, would lose a 
lot. (And indeed, it did suffer losses of $19 billion in one 
year only as a result of taking the ratings as fully accurate.) 
As UBS’s stakes were higher, they would have needed addi-
tional evidence to back the rating. For instance, they would 
have needed an answer to the question of why, in 2008, there 
were around 64,000 structured debt instruments with a triple 
A rating as compared to only 12 corporate bonds globally 
(Pagano and Volpin 2010).
The situation is further compounded by the fact that the 
precise manner in which CRAs arrive at their judgements is 
not transparent to their external users: the algorithms they 
use are proprietary, and the resulting rating is informed by 
private information obtained through conversations with the 
issuer of the rated security. A result of this ‘privacy’ is that 
users of ratings cannot eliminate the possibility that they are 
not in a situation described in Case 2.
This underscores our claim that users are in a kind of dou-
ble-jeopardy with respect to using CRA scores, exposed to 
two risks—namely, a risk from Case 1 to the effect that (i) a 
state of affairs, which the rating suggests has low probability, 
might still obtain; and a risk from Case 2 to the effect that 
(ii) the rating has no epistemic status for the users. As we 
argued above, the caveats currently issued by CRAs address 
the risk inherent in (i). They do not address the risk inherent 
in (ii), however, and a fortiori they do not address the issue 
of how that risk might synergize with the risk inherent in (i).
We envisage that one could respond by reverting to the 
claim that the CRAs simply provide ‘mere opinions’, sup-
porting an interpretation along the following lines. Surely 
ratings are nothing more than opinions, as they have no epis-
temic status for the user, but all the same, because they do 
have epistemic status for the CRA, they still provide the 
users (investors) with some evidence at least. And while that 
evidence may not be sufficient to grant the user epistemic 
status for adopting a belief in the rating alone, the rating can 
certainly be a corroborating force in the midst of other bits 
of evidence available to the user.
We do think that this response has some force. The trou-
ble is, however, that current legislation is such that it makes 
the response practically unavailable to a significant class of 
investors, namely, those investors that are bound by law to 
heed the ratings. As we saw above, since the 1930s banks, 
insurance companies, pension funds, and other institutional 
investors have been obliged to divest from securities (or to 
take specific measures when investing in securities) with rat-
ings below a certain threshold. The threshold is determined 
by the regulator, but the ratings are to be obtained from a 
handful officially recognized CRAs such as Standard & 
Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s. These investors do not have the 
option of interpreting a rating as just a bit of evidence con-
cerning credit risk amidst other available evidence. They are 
forced to act on these ratings, specifically when securities 
are downgraded and obtain ratings close to the threshold. 
While the objection has some force, then, our response is 
that it is only rational (and legitimate) to endow ratings with 
such legal status if the epistemic status of ratings entirely 
transmits to investors. This of course then raises the question 
of whether it is appropriate to legislate in a way that gives 
CRA ratings what White (2010) described as ‘force of law’. 
We now turn to this issue in our next, and last, section.
A Challenge for Regulators
So far we have argued that ratings are, among other things, 
judgements about credit risk that direct law-bound institu-
tional investors. Moreover, we have argued for the following 
three claims:
(1) There is a likely misalignment between the stakes that 
CRAs have in their ratings being adequate and those of 
the investors using the ratings.
(2) As a result, particularly since investors have no way 
of knowing that the extent to which stakes sensitiv-
ity impacts the adequacy of the ratings, this leads to a 
failure to transmit epistemic status from CRAs to their 
beneficiaries.
(3) These transmission failures are material in relation to 
investment decisions—that is, they are of substantial 
import to the investors.
This section concludes our argument by reiterating our 
main policy conclusion, and defending it against two poten-
tial objections. Our policy conclusion is that if current regu-
lation is to continue, regulators must first meet the following 
challenge: demonstrate that the harm caused by acting on 
a rating that does not have epistemic status for investors is 
compensated by the benefit from investors acting on CRA 
ratings that have epistemic status for the CRA (but not for 
the investor).
To bring this into relief, let us address two important 
ways one may be minded to respond to our case. The first is 
to wonder whether the users of CRA ratings see the practi-
cal value of the CRA ratings in terms of how accurate the 
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ratings model creditworthiness. An interesting example goes 
as follows: an investment bank selling a mortgage-backed 
security is legally obliged to have it rated by an accredited 
CRA. So it is not only potential investors interested in buy-
ing the security that will use the rating, but in an important 
sense the issuer of the security also counts as a user. One 
could now point out that the issuer is very likely to have 
already made a risk assessment using their own methods, 
and that getting a CRA to rate the security is practically use-
ful in so far as it allows the issuer to issue the security (and 
because of the correlated attractiveness to potential inves-
tors). So one could say that the rating is of practical value to 
the issuer only in an indirect way.
This is certainly true, but we should like to respond by 
noting that, first, the rating’s having this indirect practical 
value must be parasitic on the fact that regulation has made 
it a legal requirement for the bank to obtain the rating. If 
that requirement did not exist, the issuer would be com-
pletely free to choose what structured securities it would 
offer for sale. Further, surely the ratings having force of 
law gives them a legitimacy in the eyes of users that they 
would not otherwise have. As Pagano and Volpin (2010) 
show, the large appetite among investors for complex struc-
tured finance products witnessed before the subprime mort-
gage meltdown broke out in 2007 is to an important extent 
explained by their having obtained ratings from established 
CRAs. Consequently, the right question to ask when we 
are seeking to assess the practical value of CRA ratings is 
whether the existing legal requirements succeed as pieces 
of regulation.
The main reason put forward in this paper to answer this 
question negatively is that the epistemic status of ratings is 
not necessarily transmitted to investors using the ratings. 
Of course this reason may be defeasible, such that all things 
considered the regulation should be maintained. While we 
are open to this possibility, we are sceptical that this is the 
case if we bring to bear other problems with CRAs—so the 
challenge cannot be immediately ignored. Regulators are (or 
should be) well aware of the various complaints that ethicists 
and other commentators have voiced against CRAs, ranging 
from conflicts of interest in the issuer-pays model to such 
unacceptable tactics as tying, notching, and rate shopping 
(where an issuer of a security obtains ratings from various 
CRAs but only publishes the highest rating). These and other 
complaints, voiced by such authors as De Bruin (2017), 
Pagano and Volpin (2010), Scalet and Kelly (2012), and 
Strier (2008), are all to the effect that the ratings are unreli-
able and/or that investors are not in a good position to ascer-
tain the reliability. While most of these commentators favour 
stricter regulation of CRAs, the additional problem we have 
highlighted in this paper makes it less probable that further 
regulation will be able to address all these issues. The stakes 
of CRAs and beneficiaries are often extremely misaligned, 
and stricter regulation will not alter that. In such an environ-
ment, we believe, questions need to be asked whether it is 
right for the regulator to force investors to rely on ratings 
in some of their investment decisions. More transparency 
about how CRAs come to their ratings will help, but it will 
not fix things given the divergence of stakes. Moreover, we 
should recall the history of CRAs. As we saw, they devel-
oped from credit reporting agencies, who provided informa-
tion about the creditworthiness of American businesses in 
the nineteenth century. Business people, investors, and other 
interested parties used the information as a basis for their 
own judgements concerning credit risk. Only around 1910 
the letter system as we know it today was introduced. As 
Sinclair (2008, p. 24) writes: ‘The transition between issuing 
compendiums of information and actually making judgments 
about the creditworthiness of debtors occurred between the 
1907 financial crisis and the Pujo hearings of 1912’. With-
out this development, the issue of stakes sensitivity would 
not have arisen. An equally important step was taken in the 
1930s when, as we saw, the US government gave credit rat-
ings the ‘force of law’ (White 2010. p. 213). Without this 
second step, stakes sensitivity would not necessarily have 
become a concern for regulators. We hope to have shown 
that given current legislation it does.
The other important response to our policy conclusion 
that we should like to address is to ask the following: cannot 
CRAs assume a kind of mean (or median) stakes situation 
when making their assessments, and make it explicit that 
they do so? This would give a CRA rating epistemic status to 
any user, who was then able to assess the mean stakes situa-
tion vis-à-vis their own. We think this would be impractical, 
however, given the difficulty in assigning blanket accurate 
mathematical values to stakes. And even if this were possi-
ble, we would likely end up in an infinite regress: an answer 
to the question of whether the stakes in a  given situation 
for a given user are ‘average’ one would itself be subject to 
stakes sensitivity. As such, we would have to predict varia-
tion regarding what counts as assessments about ‘average’ 
stakes situations with epistemic status within subjects for 
whom more, or less, was at stake with respect to getting the 
assessment right. This leads to a vicious regress, which we 
certainly should avoid.
To recapitulate, finally, we have shown that ratings are 
judgements concerning credit risk, and insofar as judge-
ments are knowledge claims, they will display the phenom-
enon of stakes sensitivity: one and the same rating may 
have epistemic status for the CRA, but not for the inves-
tor, because their stakes are different. This is not to say that 
stakes sensitivity cannot be mitigated. Small ‘boutique’ 
CRAs can offer rating services that specifically take inves-
tor stakes into account, but such CRAs are organized in 
very different ways than the Nationally Recognized Statisti-
cal Rating Organizations whose ratings many institutional 
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investors are by law forced to follow. In other words, we 
do believe that ‘bespoke’ bond ratings can incorporate as 
much as possible the stakes of a specific investor. There 
is no principled impossibility to transmit epistemic status. 
But epistemic status transmission will generally fail with the 
‘off-the-peg’ ratings offered by the CRAs that form the topic 
of this paper. As such, we conclude that it is imperative that 
regulators begin to seriously re-think the parameters under 
which which CRAs are given force of law.
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